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The more I admire the excellence of the federal Constitu-
tion of Venezuela, the more I am convinced of the impossi-
bility of its application to our state.1
I. INTRODUCTION
HOLA is an internationally recognized weekly magazine that
has circulated in Venezuela for forty years. 2 In 1971, HOLA's pub-
lisher, Compania Mercantil An6nima HOLA, S.A. of Madrid
(HOLA S.A.), registered "HOLA" as a trademark in Venezuela
through a Venezuelan attorney/industrial property agent'
In the early 1980s, a large Venezuelan publishing group,
Bloque de Armas, attempted to acquire the exclusive rights to dis-
tribute HOLA in Venezuela.4 Rebuffed by both the Madrid pub-
lisher and its Venezuelan distributor, in 1985, Bloque de Armas
attempted to register the trademark "HOLA EASA," to begin pub-
lishing its own magazine.5 The Venezuelan Industrial Property
Registry rejected the application, recognizing the current registra-
tion of the HOLA trademark.6
Undaunted, Bloque de Armas enlisted the services of the same
industrial property agent who previously registered the HOLA
trademark.7 With his assistance, Bloque de Armas gained trade-
mark rights to HOLA EASA on January 20, 1992.' Bloque de Ar-
mas then petitioned the First Labor Court of the Fourth Instance
to prohibit the circulation of HOLA in Venezuela on grounds that
its continued circulation hurt the Venezuelan employees of HOLA
EASA.9 The court granted Bloque de Armas' request that same
day, and the Sixth Superior Labor Court ratified it within twenty-
four hours.' 0 In addition, the 37th Penal and Patrimony Safeguard
1. Sim6n Bolivar, Address Delivered at the Inauguration of the Second National Con-
gress of Venezuela in Angostura (Feb. 15, 1819), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BOLIVAR 179
(Harold A. Bierck, Jr. ed., 1951).
2. John Sweeney, The HOLA Trademark Piracy Scandal: A Tale of Double-Dealing
Lawyers, Judicial Terrorism, and Incompetence and Corruption at the Development Min-
istry, VENECONOMY MONTHLY, July 1992, at 11.
3. Id. at 12.
4. Hola Scandal Brews, Bus. LATIN AM., Aug. 24, 1992, at 291.
5. Id.
6. Sweeney, supra note 2, at 12.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id.
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Court placed HOLA S.A. under summary investigation. 1 As a re-
sult of these injunctions, HOLA EASA replaced HOLA on Vene-
zuelan newsstands.
12
HOLA S.A. formally asked the Registrar of Industrial Prop-
erty to nullify the HOLA EASA trademark.' 3 In its memorandum,
HOLA S.A. based its request on the Venezuelan 1955 Industrial
Property Law,"' administrative law, and consumer protection
theory.15
One month later, the head of the Industrial Property Registry
rejected the arguments of HOLA S.A. and upheld both trade-
marks. 16 The case created an international scandal. The Registrar
resigned, the attorney general investigated the penal court judge
who issued the injunction, and the King of Spain spoke with Vene-
zuelan President P6rez concerning HOLA S.A.'s victimization. 7
The HOLA scandal is one recent example of the lax intellec-
tual property protection in Venezuela. Intellectual property' s is a
major component of international economics.' 9 It is particularly
important to Latin American countries because it offers the oppor-
tunity to transform them from lesser developed to developed
ones.
2 0
Since World War II, Latin American countries have consid-
ered technology transfer2' both a potential cure-all for un-
11. Id.
12. Hola Scandal Brews, supra note 4, at 291.
13. Request from Cecilia Acosta Mayoral and Flavio Chivez B. to Dr. Thaimy Mir-
quez, Registrar of Industrial Property, (June 3, 1992) [hereinafter Request to Registrar of
Industrial Property] (on file with the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
14. Ley de Propiedad Industrial de 1955 [1955 Industrial Property Law] (Venez.),
translated in 21 JOHN P. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, at V-1 (1992).
15. Request to Registrar of Industrial Property, supra note 13. The brief argued that
the 1955 Industrial Property Law aims to protect not merely trademarks, but the consuming
public as well.
16. Resolution No. 59 of the Venezuelan Registry of Industrial Property, July 20, 1992
(on file with the Inter-American Law Review).
17. John Sweeney, The Hola Trademark Piracy Scandal (Part II), VENECONOMY
MONTHLY, Nov. 1992, at 22; Sweeney, supra note 2, at 13.
18. Intellectual property has two main areas: industrial property (inventions, trade-
marks, and industrial designs), and copyright (protection of expression). ROBERT P. BENKO,
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, ISSUES, AND CONTROVERSIES 2-3 (1989).
19. Frederic Benech, La place du droit de la proprit6 intellectuelle dans le droit in-
ternational tconomique, 22 REV. G9N. 423, 423 (1991).
20. See Richard N. Brown, The Little Recognized Connection Between Intellectual
Property and Economic Development in Latin America, 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPY-
RIGHT L. 348, 348 (1991).
21. Technology transfer is "the process by which science and technology are diffused
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derdevelopment and a source of international economic inequity.2 2
Latin American intellectual property law reflects this ambivalence
in its efforts to attract beneficial technology without concurrently
securing protection for intellectual property rights.
Part II of this Comment reviews the theories and events which
formed the backdrop for the creation of rules for Latin American
intellectual property. Part III discusses Andean Pact (ANCOM)
technology transfer laws, including ANCOM's recently adopted
Decision 313. Part IV focuses on the corresponding laws of Vene-
zuela, an ANCOM member, and reviews Venezuela's schizophrenic
approach to Decision 313. Part V analyzes the systemic barriers to
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in Venezuela
and argues that merely promulgating stricter laws will not ensure a
higher level of intellectual property protection. Part VI uses the
rubric of a bazaar to illustrate the decision-making process in tech-
nology transfer negotiations and then reviews the formation of pol-
icy-making elitist groups in Venezuela. This Comment proposes
that Venezuela will provide the heightened intellectual property
protection within ANCOM Decision 313 only if policy-makers con-
clude that the advantages of participation in international free
trade agreements outweigh the short-term benefits of lax intellec-
tual property enforcement.
II. LATIN AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Before 1929, Latin American economic development depended
almost entirely on exports of raw materials.2" The global depres-
sion of 1929 highlighted this dependence on exports.24 Latin Amer-
ican governments responded by adopting import-substitution poli-
cies, which required foreign capital and technology.25 This created
throughout human activity." David M. Haug, The International Transfer of Technology:
Lessons that East Europe Can Learn from the Failed Third World Experience, 5 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 209, 211 (1992) (citing Harold Brooks, National Science Policy and Technol-
ogy Transfer, in NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, CONFERENCE ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
AND INNOVATION (1966)).
22. See Carlos M. Correa, Transfer of Technology in Latin America: A Decade of Con-
trol, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 388, 390 (1981).
23. See ALAN GILBERT, LATIN AMERICA 18-21 (1990).
24. Id.
25. Id. One commentator defines technology as "anything, tangible or intangible, that
could contribute to the economic, industrial, or cultural development of a country, whether
or not that technology is presently available to the country." Haug, supra note 21, at 211.
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a new form of dependency.
26
To combat this, "dependency" theories 7 of the 1960s sug-
gested industrialization and regional economic integration as key
instruments in Latin American economic development. 28 Disciples
of dependency theory considered technological change integral to
economic development.29 Latin American theorists and politicians,
in contrast, viewed reliance on foreign technology as a defining
trait of their dependency.30
Technology transfer was not the developing countries' pan-
acea. Multinational corporations used their stronger bargaining po-
sitions to negotiate agreements incorporating restrictive clauses,
producing yet another form of dependency: "technological
colonialism."3 1
In the early 1970s, North-South relations were among the
prominent issues of international economic and political negotia-
Another defines technology that is bought and sold as:
1. Capital goods including machinery and productive systems.
2. Human labor, usually skilled manpower, and management specialized
scientists.
3. Information of both technical and commercial character, including that which
is readily available and that subject to proprietary rights and restrictions.
H. Ledin, Methods of Transfer, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
FIRMS 12 (Frank R. Bradbury ed., 1978).
26. GILBERT, supra note 23, at 21.
27. Dependency theory posits that Latin America's underdevelopment is due to socio-
economic factors. It also asserts that the colonial structure of world capitalism caused Latin
America to become economically, politically, and culturally dependent on foreign powers.
See ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION, at ix-x
(1969).
Dependency theory suggests that while foreign investment in Latin America promotes
industrialization, it creates continued dependence on foreign corporations and capital-prov-
iders, leading to:
1. displacement of national entrepreneurs;
2. preemptive financing (local interests are less likely than foreign interests to
get commercial financing);
3. unequal bargaining positions;
4. restraints on transfer of technology;
5. increased balance of payments problems.
See Joseph J. Jova, Private Investment in Latin America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 10
TEX. INT'L L.J. 455, 470-73 (1975).
28. Allan Preziosi, The Andean Pact's Foreign Investment Code Decision 220: An
Agreement to Disagree, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 649, 653 (1989).
29. Haug, supra note 21, at 217-18.
30. Dale B. Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign In-
vestments, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 332 (1972).
31. Haug, supra note 21, at 218.
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tions. 2 Demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)
dominated many conferences, 3 with technology transfer represent-
ing an essential element of the NIEO.34 NIEO advocates criticized
the international intellectual property system, claiming that (i) in-
tellectual property rights created monopolies, causing technology
to be unjustly expensive; (ii) knowledge and technology were the
common heritage of mankind; and (iii) development of less-devel-
oped countries (LDCs) was in the global interest.
3 5
Further, policy-makers in LDCs saw no correlation between
intellectual property protection and national technological or eco-
nomic sectors' advancement.36 They hoped that strict regulation,
rather than protection, of technology transfer would prevent over-
dependence on foreign capital.
3 7
Acting on these theories, many Latin American countries sub-
stantially reformed their laws to limit the protection of intellectual
property.38 Generally, they sought to improve the commercial con-
ditions of agreements (particularly those concerning price), elimi-
nate restrictive practices, and unpack the various components in-
cluded in technology transfers.3 9 Specifically, the new regimes'
goals included (i) redefinition of the concept of "invention"; (ii)
heightened conditions for patent exploitation; (iii) elimination of
import monopolies granted to patentees; and (iv) lower patent pro-
tection in areas such as pharmaceuticals and energy.4 °
The global economic downturn of the 1970s thwarted the
hopes of the NIEO movement. "1 By 1976, two years after the
32. JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, DEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE 13 (1985); see also Carlos
Mouchet, Some Notes on Copyright in Latin America, 7 COPYRIGHT 223 (1971).
33. Some examples include the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
of 1974 (adopting the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order) and The Conference on International Economic Cooperation
of 1974 (the so-called North-South Conference). See generally CHARLES A. JONES, THE
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE: A BRIEF HISTORY 56-57 (1983).
34. Haug, supra note 21, at 219.
35. BENKO, supra note 18, at 28.
36. See Le-Nhung McLeland & J. Herbert O'Toole, Patent Systems in Less Developed
Countries: The Cases of India and the Andean Pact Countries, 2 J.L. & TECH. 229, 231
(1987).
37. See Mark B. Baker & Mark D. Holmes, An Analysis of Latin American Foreign
Investment Law: Proposals for Striking a Balance Between Foreign Investment and Politi-
cal Stability, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1991).
38. See Correa, supra note 22, at 388.
39. Id. at 392.
40. Id.
41. See JAMES F. PETRAS, LATIN AMERICA: BANKERS, GENERALS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
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United Nations General Assembly approved the Declaration and
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order,42 the NIEO was moribund.' 3 By the early 1980s,
the South's unified voice had degenerated from "solidarity and
confrontation" into a "frustrated Southern monologue."
4
4
The late 1980s brought fundamental change to Latin Ameri-
can political and economic planning. Protectionist policies gave
way to free trade and economic liberalism. 4'5 This new outlook was
a response to international trends toward regional free trade, ex-
emplified by the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI),"
NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the consolidation of the European
Common Market.' 7 Nearly all Latin American countries have
signed bilateral agreements with the United States under the
EAI.48 Further, the United States considers intellectual property
rights protection a prerequisite for participation in free trade
agreements.'9 Similarly, all EAI agreements' preambles and appen-
dixes mention intellectual property.5 0
The 1990s began with major changes in Latin American intel-
lectual property legislation. During the previous decade, only six
countries changed their intellectual property laws; in 1991 alone,
nine altered or planned to modify their laws.51 These changes
SOCIAL JUSTICE 75 (1986).
42. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), re-
printed in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
43. Haug, supra note 21, at 220.
44. BHAGWATI, supra note 32, at 49.
45. See Gary C. Hufbauer et al., Options for a Hemispheric Trade Order, 22 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM L. REV. 261, 268 (1991); see also Stephen Graham, Free Trade in the Americas: A
New Engine for Growth, Bus. LATIN Am., Oct. 26, 1992, at 373-74.
46. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, a broad socio-economic program pro-
posed by President Bush, seeks to create a free trade zone encompassing the entire Western
hemisphere while encouraging democratic governments and market-oriented planning. See
Hufbauer, supra note 45, at 264-65.
47. See generally id. at 269. Other forces prompting liberal approaches to intellectual
property protection are increased foreign debt and decreased direct foreign investment. See
Carlos Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case for and Against Intellectual Property
Protection, in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 69-72 (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 112, 1990).
48. Enterprise for the Americas: Vision and Reality, in NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES (Univ. of
Miami North-South Ctr.), July 1992, at 4 [hereinafter Enterprise for the Americas].
49. See Trade Report Sounds Warning on Intellectual Piracy, AM. BANKER-BOND
BUYER, Apr. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AMBANK File.
50. See Trade Favors are Incentive for Tougher Standards, LAGNIAPPE LETTER, Aug.
21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAGLTR File.
51. Intellectual Property Protection in South America, INT'L Bus. DAILY, Dec. 24, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIBD File.
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evince governmental attempts to improve their economies through
intellectual property legislation.
52
On April 7, 1991, under the auspices of the EAI, Venezuela
signed a bilateral framework agreement with the United States.53
The United States and Venezuela have also established a formal
business council under EAI. 54 While recent free trade talks be-
tween Venezuela and the United States included negotiations of a
possible intellectual property treaty,55 on April 29, 1992 the United
States Trade Representative placed Venezuela on its "watch list"
of intellectual property offenders.5 6
Free trade is now the impetus behind development of Latin
American intellectual property regimes. These countries are re-
sponding to two primary forces: the "carrot" and the "stick." A
chance to participate in the movement toward regional agreements
is the "carrot" of free trade. The threat of punitive trade sanctions
represents the "stick.
'5 7
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ANDEAN PACT
The Agreement of Andean Subregional Integration of May 26,
196951 created the Andean Common Market.59 Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela are its current members.6
52. Id.
53. Framework Accord is Signed with US, LAGNIAPPE LETTER, Apr. 19, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAGLTR File.
54. See Enterprise for the Americas, supra note 48, at 4.
55. Venezuela and the United States Hold Preliminary Free Trade Talks, NOTIMEX
MEXICAN NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NOTIMX File.
56. Paul Verna, RIAA, Paraguay, El Salvador Menace Copyright Owners, BILLBOARD,
May 9, 1992, at 8.
57. Under section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the 1988 Trade
Act, intellectual property protection is a condition for the granting of GSP (general system
of preferences) benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988). See R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual
Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 224 (1989).
58. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, opened for signature May 26, 1969,
translated in 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement].
59. ANCOM was a result of the 1960s Latin American economic integration movement.
See Roberto Danino, The Andean Code After Five Years, 8 LAW. AM. 635, 636 (1976). It was
a subregional group of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), whose goal
was the establishment of a regional free trade area. For a general history of Latin American
economic integration see ALBERT S. GOLBERT & YENNY NUN, LATIN AMERICAN LAWS AND IN-
STITUTIONS (1982).
60. Chile was an original member but dropped out in 1976. Preziosi, supra note 28, at
650 n.2. Venezuela took part in the ANCOM framework negotiations, but did not sign the
Cartagena Agreement. 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969). Venezuela eventually agreed to join ANCOM on
[Vol. 25:1
1993] VENEZUELAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 139
ANCOM aimed to promote member countries' development
through economic integration and creation of a common market
with a single external tariff.61 ANCOM's charter called for coordi-
nation of economic and social policies and the unification of do-
mestic laws.2 While the Latin American Free Trade Association's
(LAFTA) objective was mainly trade liberalization through tariff
reductions, ANCOM covered all aspects of regional economic activ-
ity through the creation of a common market.6 3 In the intellectual
property area, the Andean Pact Commission had power to create a
uniform regulation of trademarks, patents, licenses, royalties, and
foreign investment.
6 4
A. Subregional Import-Substitution: ANCOM Decision 24
ANCOM was adverse to intellectual property protection from
its inception. 5 In 1970 ANCOM passed Decision 24,66 regulating
foreign investment and technology transfer.6 Technology transfer
was the most complex area covered by this legislation. 8 Decision
24 was the "cornerstone of the original integration scheme" 69 of
ANCOM, and one of its most notorious features.7
Realizing that most technology transfers related to equity in-
vestments and were not merely licensing agreements, the drafters
of Decision 24 linked foreign investment controls with technology
transfer policies.7 1 The preamble reiterated language from
February 13, 1973, and became a full member on January 1, 1974. 12 I.L.M. 344 (1973).
61. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 58, arts. 1-3.
62. Id.
63. See Lloyd Pike, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Overview, 7 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 656, 658 (1977).
64. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 58, art. 27.
65. Richard N. Brown, Guarding Your Company's Bright Ideas, Bus. VENEZ., May
1992, at 33.
66. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents,
Licenses and Royalties, Decision 24 of Nov. 30, 1976, Commission of the Cartagena Agree-
ment, translated in 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977) [hereinafter Decision 24].
67. Susan C. Fouts, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 10 TEx. INT'L L.J. 537
(1975).
68. Furnish, supra note 30, at 330.
69. John R. Pate, Andean Group: Commission Decision 220 Replacing Decision 24,
The Common Foreign Investment and Technology Licensing Code, 27 I.L.M. 974, 974
(1988).
70. Decision 24 directly influenced other Latin American intellectual property regimes,
including Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. See James Leavy, Latin American Laws on Trans-
fers of Technology, 3 INTER-AM. LEGAL MATERIALS 353, 369 (1987).
71. John R. Pate, The Andean Common Market, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAWS AND
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
ANCOM's Declaration of Bogotj 72 that proposed the adoption of
"standards that [would] facilitate the use of modern technology
without limiting the market for products manufactured with for-
eign technical assistance, and the coordination of foreign invest-
ments with general development plans."' "7 The Decision made for-
eign technology policy subservient to the goal of regional
integration.
With Decision 24, ANCOM redefined the basis of the North-
South relationship.7 4 Rather than attract foreign capital by offering
special privileges to multi-national corporations (MNCs), Decision
24 attempted to attract foreign capital on the basis of mutual ben-
efits arising from Latin American economic integration.73 The De-
cision had four basic purposes: (i) to exclude foreign investments
from key sectors of the market economy; (ii) to reduce foreign par-
ticipation in local companies to minority positions; (iii) to diminish
reliance on foreign technology while stimulating the development
of local technology; and (iv) to avoid competition among ANCOM
members when offering incentives to foreign investors.7e Decision
24 also incorporated a "fade-out" provision designed to convert
foreign investments into national ownership.
77
Predictably, developed countries were critical of this approach
and complained that the new laws were unduly restrictive.78 They
PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA 59 (Beverly May Carl ed., 1978); see also Baker & Holmes,
supra note 37, at 8-10.
72. Declaration of Bogota, Aug. 16, 1966, translated in INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTE-
GRATION: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 149 (1975). The Declaration memorialized dis-
cussions among Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru concerning goals of Latin
American development. See GOLBERT & NUN, supra note 59, at 263.
73. Decision 24, supra note 66, pmbl.
74. See Ricardo Borzutsky, Decision 24 of the Cartagena Agreement: Analysis of the
Andean Approach to Technology Transfer, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT:
AN HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 197 (Robert E. Driscoll & Harvey W. Wal-
lender III eds., 1974).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Preziosi, supra note 28, at 657-58.
78. See John E. Dull, Transfer of Technology to Latin America: A U.S. Corporate
View, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT: AN HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC PER-
SPECTIVE 261, 275 (Robert E. Driscoll and Harvey W. Wallender III eds., 1974). Dull reports:
I have heard it said that Latin American businessmen need these tight regula-
tions to strengthen their bargaining position. I detect in this some feeling of
inherent inferiority, but I don't believe it for a moment. Those of you who have
negotiated with Latin American businessmen know very well that they can con-
duct as tough negotiations and drive as hard bargains as anyone else.
I submit that what is really needed is the creation of an open atmosphere
for true arms-length negotiations in which both the buyers and sellers can obtain
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argued that adequate economic incentives were necessary for tech-
nological advancement and that monopoly rights be enforced to
ensure adequate compensation for private innovation.7" Foreign
corporations protested that the new laws failed to accommodate
industry differences, reduced flexibility, and frustrated profit
maximization."0
Decision 24 proclaimed that "national enterprises must have
the best possible access to modern technology, 8 1 while maintain-
ing that it was "necessary to establish efficient mechanisms and
procedures for the production and protection of technology in the
territory of the subregion and to improve the terms under which
foreign technology is acquired.
8 2
To achieve its goals, Decision 24's authors relied on the basic
mechanics of registration and disclosure.8 " The Decision called for
each Member to create a Competent National Authority (CNA),
whose approval was necessary for any contract involving technol-
ogy transfer.84 Each country's CNA would decide whether the im-
ported technology would make an "effective contribution"85 to
ANCOM goals.88 A central ANCOM organ, The Subregional Office
of Industrial Property, would coordinate technology policies be-
tween members.8 7
Decision 24 outlawed the use of restrictive clauses in technol-
ogy agreements by ANCOM members.8 8 It also barred, except in
what they need.
Id.
79. See BENKO, supra note 18, at 28.
80. Dull, supra note 78, at 275; see also FRANKLIN TUGWELL, THE POLITICS OF OIL IN
VENEZUELA 15 (1975).
81. Decision 24, supra note 66, declaration 6.
82. Id.
83. Furnish, supra note 30, at 330.
84. Decision 24, supra note 66, art. 18.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 54.
88. Article 20 barred the following clauses:
a) clauses obligating the recipient of technology to acquire from a specific source
raw materials, intermediate products, capital goods, other technologies, or per-
manent employees, except in exceptional cases;
b) clauses allowing the seller of technology the right to set resale prices of prod-
ucts manufactured using the technology;
c) clauses containing restrictions regarding the volume and structure of
production;
d) clauses prohibiting the use of competitive technology;
e) clauses establishing purchase options for the technology supplier;
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exceptional cases, the inclusion of any clauses which prohibited or
limited exports of products manufactured with licensed technol-
ogy.89 It allowed no limitations which interfered with ANCOM
members' trade or exports of similar products to third-party
countries.9 0
B. ANCOM Decisions 84 and 85
In 1974, ANCOM addressed the issues surrounding technology
and industrial property in Decisions 8491 and 85.92 Decision 84 pro-
claimed that technological dependency existed, and that this de-
pendency generated serious negative effects.9 3 It also declared the
need for a regional policy of technological development.
9 4
Decision 85 dealt with specifics of industrial property law.
Chapter I covered patents, Chapter II industrial drawings and
models, and Chapter III trademarks. Decision 85 prohibited the
granting of patents for (i) inventions contravening public order; (ii)
vegetable varieties, animal races, and processes for obtaining vege-
tables and animals; (iii) pharmaceutical products, medications,
beverages and foods for human or animal consumption; and (iv)
inventions affecting the development of ANCOM members' proce-
dures or products.
9 5
f) clauses obligating the technology purchaser to provide the technology supplier
with any inventions or improvements gained through use of the purchased
technology;
g) clauses requiring royalty payments for unworked patents;
h) any other equivalent clauses.
Decision 24, supra note 66, art. 20; see also Robert J. Radway, Venezuela: Certain Legal
Considerations for Doing Business, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 289, 303 (1976).
89. Radway, supra note 88, at 303.
90. Id.
91. Decision on the Basis for A Subregional Technological Policy, Decision 84, Com-
mission of the Cartagena Agreement, GRuPO ANDINO, Separata No. 28, pp. 1-11, June 1974,
translated in 13 I.L.M. 1478 (1974) [hereinafter Decision 84].
92. Decision on Industrial Property, Decision 85, Commission of the Cartagena Agree-
ment, GRUPO ANDINO, Separata No. 28, pp. 12-22, June 1974, translated in 13 I.L.M. 1489
(1974) [hereinafter Decision 85].
93. Decision 84, supra note 91, pmbl.
94. Id.
95. Decision 85, supra note 92, art. 5.
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C. Coming Full Circle: The Quito Protocol and ANCOM De-
cisions 220 and 291
The Quito Protocol 6 represented the fourth major modifica-
tion to the Cartagena Agreement.9 7 Unlike previous amendments,98
which were limited to issues of membership and timetables, the
Quito Protocol provided for "fundamental, substantive reforms in
the Andean integration program.""9 It recognized a change in the
economic and political environments of ANCOM countries and al-
lowed greater flexibility in the ANCOM integration scheme. 100
The Protocol's objectives for technology transfer were:
a) creation of subregional capabilities responsive to the chal-
lenges of the scientific-technological revolution;
b) contribution of science and technology to the conceptualiza-
tion and execution of strategies and programs for Andean devel-
opment; and
c) utilization of the mechanisms of economic integration to stim-
ulate technological innovation and productive modernization. 10 1
On May 18, 1987, the Presidents of the ANCOM countries ap-
proved Decision 220.102 Decision 220 replaced Decision 24 as
ANCOM law for technology and foreign investment.103 Similar to
the Quito Protocol, Decision 220 recognized that Decision 24's poli-
96. Quito Protocol Amending the Cartagena Agreement, May 12, 1987, reprinted in
ACUERDO DE INTEGRACION SUBREGIONAL, REGIMEN DE CAPITALES EXTRANJEROS Y OTRAS DECI-
SIONES 34 (1990) [hereinafter Quito Protocol].
97. See John R. Pate, Andean Pact: Official Codified Text of the Cartegena Agreement
Incorporating the Quito Protocol, 28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989).
98. The others were:
1. Final Act of the Negotiations between the Commission of the Cartagena
Agreement and Venezuela for Adherence to the Agreement, Feb. 13, 1973, trans-
lated in INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-
BEAN 219 (1975).
2. Lima Protocol Amending the Cartagena Agreement on Andean Subregional
Integration, Oct. 30, 1976, translated in 16 I.L.M. 1585 (1976).
3. Protocol of Arequipa, reprinted in JORGE MARIO EASTMAN, EL PACTo ANDINO,
AYER Y Hov 137 (1982).
4. Decision Terminating the Membership of Chile, Decision 102 of Oct. 30, 1976,
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, noted at 16 I.L.M. 235 (1976).
99. Pate, supra note 97, at 1165-66.
100. Id.
101. Quito Protocol, supra note 96.
102. The Common Foreign Investment and Technology Licensing Code, Decision 220
of May 11, 1987, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, translated in 27 I.L.M. 978
(1988) [hereinafter Decision 220].
103. See Pate, supra note 69, at 974.
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cies had failed to achieve national economic development goals.1""
Decision 220 reversed the binding norms of Decision 24 and al-
lowed each ANCOM member to draft its own regulations for for-
eign investment and technology.
1 0 5
Decision 220 preserved most of Decision 24's regulations
prohibiting restrictive clauses in technology agreements. 10 6 How-
ever, it notably permitted remittance of royalties to foreign parent
companies or affiliates who made "intangible technological contri-
butions.' 0 7 Such contributors were defined as "resources derived
from the technology, such as trademarks, industrial models, tech-
nical assistance, and technical know-how, patented or not, which
can be presented in the form of objects, technical documents, or
instructions.' 0 8
In replacing Decision 220 with Decision 291109 in March 1991,
ANCOM returned to its prior liberal policies of foreign investment
and technology transfer existing before Decision 24.110 The only
obligatory norms of technology transfers articulated in Decision
291 concerned licenses. Licenses had to be registered and could not
prohibit exports of goods produced with licensed technology to
ANCOM members or prohibit export of similar products to third
countries."'
104. See id. listing the following factors:
1. Decision 24 was an obstacle to foreign investment, technology, and credit
flows;
2. Decision 220 recognized that ANCOM members failed to follow Decision 24
because they did not find it in their best interest;
3. While Decision 24 was a linchpin of ANCOM's original integration policy, it
was possible to have a viable regional scheme without a uniform foreign invest-
ment and technology policy.
105. Preziosi, supra note 28, at 668.
106. Decision 220, supra note 102, arts. 18-20.
107. Id. art. 21.
108. Id.
109. Common Code for the Treatment of Foreign Capital and on Trademarks, Pat-
ents, Licenses and Royalties, Decision 291 of Mar. 21, 1991, Commission of the Cartagena
Agreement, GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA, Year VIII, No. 80, Apr. 4, 1991, at
44, translated in 30 I.L.M. 1288 (1991).
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D. ANCOM's New Industrial Property Law: Decisions 311
and 313
The ANCOM Presidents met in Cartagena, Colombia during
December 3 through 5, 1991 to sign Decision 311.112 That Decision
embodied a new ANCOM industrial property law.11s Decision
313114 swiftly superseded Decision 311.
1. Patents
Decision 313 provides for fifteen-year patent grants with a
possible one-time extension of five years, conditioned on working
the patent.115 Patents on models of utility are available for ten-
year periods,11 and for eight-year periods on industrial designs.
1 17
The patent holder must ensure the patent's exploitation in an
ANCOM state." 8 Notably, Decision 313 continues to bar patents
for pharmaceuticals that the World Health Organization (WHO)
lists as essential medicines.119 Further, member states may bar pat-
entability for pharmaceuticals absent from the WHO list for no
more than ten years after the Decision's passage.1 20 Pharmaceutical
patents receive no transitional protection.
2. Trademarks
Decision 313 provides for the registration of trade and service
marks.121 Non-registrable marks include those intrinsic colors and
marks which may confuse consumers as to the product's place of
origin."' Notorious marks receive protection subject to reciproc-
112. Common Regime of Industrial Property, Decision 311, Commission of the Carta-
gena Agreement, GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA, Year VIII, No. 96, Dec. 12,
1991, translated in 5 INTER-AM. LEGAL MATERIALS 174 (1992).
113. Franklin Hoet Linares, Venezuela: A New Era of International Trade and the
Emerging Regime Governing Intellectual Property, L./TECH., 4th Qtr., 1991, at 1, 7.
114. Common Regime of Industrial Property, Decision 313, Commission of the Carta-
gena Agreement, GACETA OFIcIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA, Year IX, No. 101, Feb. 16,
1992, at 1, translated in 32 I.L.M. 182 (1993) [hereinafter Decision 313].
115. Id. art. 30.
116. Id. art. 56.
117. Id. art. 64.
118. Id. art. 37.
119. Id. art. 7(d).
120. Id. trans. prov. 3.
121. Id. art. 71.
122. Id. art. 72.
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ity.123 ANCOM members may join international conventions,
which was not possible under ANCOM Decision 85.124
3. Obligatory Licenses
Licensees must exploit the patent within two years following
the license concession. 25 Decision 313 permits compulsory licens-
ing, but allows each Member to establish its own legislation. 126 In-
terested parties may obtain a compulsory license where attempts
at contractual licensing under "reasonable conditions '1 27 prove
fruitless and one of the following conditions exists:
a) insufficient production of the invention in the Member state
where the party requested a license;
b) failure to distribute, market, or import the patented product
sufficiently to satisfy market requirements in the Member state
where the party requested the license;
c) suspension of working the patent for more than one year.
121
In addition, CNAs may grant compulsory licenses to avoid market




Decision 313 permits each ANCOM member to provide greater
intellectual property protection than the ANCOM decision. 13 0 It
binds the ANCOM countries to exchange information concerning
patents granted or rejected,' and allows members to share expert
evaluators' services."'
IV. VENEZUELAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION
This Comment now turns to domestic legislation that Vene-
123. Id. art. 73.
124. See Brown, supra note 65, at 36.
125. Decision 313, supra note 114, art. 46.
126. Id. art. 49.
127. Id. art. 41.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 42.
130. Id. art. 118.
131. Id. art. 32.
132. Id. art. 28.
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zuela promulgated to realize the over-arching goals of ANCOM.
While tracing the development of Venezuela's written laws, the
true effect of laws such as Decision 24 and its progeny, and their
application in Venezuela in particular, must be seen not by refer-
ence to the rules themselves, but to their interpretation and
application.'
A. Venezuelan Adoption of ANCOM Decision 24: Decrees 63
and 64
The Venezuelan 1955 Industrial Property Law 84 provides for
grants of patents and trademarks. Patents are available for inven-
tions, improvements, industrial models or drawings, and patents of
introduction.13 5 Non-patentable items include: pharmaceuticals;
methods of working or manufacture; and inventions contrary to
national laws, public order, or national security.136
The Venezuelan Congress ratified Decision 24 at the same
time it approved Venezuela's formal entry into ANCOM. 3 Most
commentators postulated that Venezuela would enforce the provi-
sions of Decision 24 leniently within its own domestic legal sys-
tem.'18 However, the 1973-74 rise in world oil prices changed mat-
ters considerably.3 9 OPEC's success radically altered the balance
of North-South economic relations, causing an increase in Vene-
zuela's oil revenues. 40 Venezuela's increased revenues enabled it to
133. See EDUARDO ARROYO TALAVERA, ELECTIONS AND NEGOTIATION: THE LIMITS OF DE-
MOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 1958-1981, at 331 (1986); see also the HOLA example, supra text
accompanying notes 2-17.
134. 1955 Industrial Property Law, supra note 14.
135. Id. art. 5.
136. Id. art. 15.
137. Law Approving the Cartegena Agreement, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No. 1,620, Nov.
1, 1973 (Venez.); see also Fouts, supra note 67, at 544.
138. Fouts, supra note 67, at 550.
139. Id.
140. OPEC's success changed the tenor of the North-South relationship by:
1. creating the idea of "commodity power," which threatened developed coun-
tries with the possibility that commodities other than oil could be cartelized.
This produced a perception of greater transactional equality and allowed LDCs
to enter into negotiations more powerfully;
2. convincing the North that the South had this power;
3. focusing world attention on commodity power;
4. allowing the South to include other issues in the negotiating process (e.g.,
trade, currency issues, and aid).
See BHAGWATI, supra note 32, at 41-43. For an extensive discussion of Venezuelan oil,
OPEC, and North-South relations see Luis VALLENILLA, OIL: THE MAKING OF A NEW Eco-
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purchase the required technologies outright and apply Decision 24
stringently.1
4 1
Venezuela implemented Decision 24 with Decrees 62142 and
631"s in April 1974. Decree 62 reserved certain industries for na-
tional companies. 144 Decree 63 provided that Decision 24 and De-
cree 63 govern trademark, patent, licensing, and royalty (as well as
foreign investment) contracts. 1 5 It also created the Superinten-
dency of Foreign Investments (SIEX) to administer Decision 24
and to serve as Venezuela's Competent National Authority.1
46
SIEX was responsible for maintaining a registry for approval of
contracts'4 and creating an Advisory Committee to evaluate tech-
nology transfer agreements. 48 The Superintendent of Foreign In-
vestments chaired the committee, and its members were represent-
atives of the Ministry of Finance and Development, the Central
Office of Coordination and Planning, the Central Bank of Vene-
zuela, and the Institute of External Commerce. 1 9 In short, techno-
crats, who adapted investment and technology agreements to reach
goals of national economic development, managed SIEX.150
Decree 63 required SIEX approval of all contracts involving
trademarks, patents, or technology importation.'6 ' The Decree also
mandated registration of all documents concerning:
1. the grant of use or authorization for trademark exploitation;
2. the grant of use or authorization for exploitation of inven-
tions, improvements, models, and industrial designs;
3. furnishing technical know-how through plans, diagrams, in-
structive models, instructions, formulas, specifications, training,
and any other means;
NOMIC ORDER: VENEZUELAN OIL AND OPEC (1975).
141. See John R. Pate, Venezuela: New Foreign Investment and Licensing Regulations
and Related Documents, 26 I.L.M. 760 (1987); see also Robert J. Radway & Franklin T.
Hoet Linares, Venezuela Revisited: Foreign Investment, Technology, and Related Issues,
15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 17 (1982).
142. Decree 62, GACETA OFIcIAL EXTRA., No. 1,650, Apr. 29, 1974 (Venez.), translated in
13 I.L.M. 1220 (1974).
143. Decree 63, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA., No. 1,650, Apr. 29, 1974 (Venez.), translated in
13 I.L.M. 1221 (1974).
144. Decree 62, supra note 142, art. 1.
145. Decree 63, supra note 143, art. 1.
146. Id. art. 3.
147. Id. art. 9.
148. Id. art. 10.
149. Id. art. 11.
150. See Radway & Hoet Linares, supra note 141, at 16.
151. Decree 63, supra note 143, art. 54.
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4. furnishing basic, detailed engineering for manufacturing
plants;
5. technical assistance in all forms;
6. administrative services."'
Contract documents had to contain detailed information,
153
and SIEX could define restrictive clauses which would void regis-
tration.154 Decree 63 also obligated foreign technology suppliers to
train national personnel. 55
B. Augmenting Decision 24: Decrees 746 and 2442
ANCOM's initial basic technology regulations were Decisions
24, 84, and 85.156 These regulations created a minimum intellectual
property regime, freeing each country to adopt more restrictive na-
tional legislation.
157
Venezuela never adopted Decision 85.158 Instead, it created
tighter technology transfer controls with Decrees 746159 and
2442.16° While the difference was small, Venezuela believed it nec-
essary to promulgate its own explicit regulations in certain areas.161
Decree 746 increased the number of restricted clauses in technol-
ogy agreements. 1 2 Decree 2442 specified the required registration
152. Id. art. 55.
153. Id. art. 56.
154. Id. art. 57.
155. Id. art. 58.
156. See Pate, supra note 71, at 62.
157. Id.
158. Brown, supra note 65, at 33.
159. Decree 746, Apr. 28, 1974, GACETA OFICIALd, No. 30,635, Mar. 1, 1975 (Venez.),
translated in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, LAWS AND PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 71,
at 272.
160. Decree 2442, Nov. 8, 1977, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA., No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977
(Venez.), translated in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAWS AND PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra
note 71, at 274.
161. Pate, supra note 71, at 67.
162. Among the clauses banned were those that:
a) prohibited the manufacture or sale of products made with the technology
once the contract was terminated;
b) prohibited the use of know-how acquired through the contracted technology
after termination of the contract;
c) prohibited the use of similar like commercial trademarks once the contract
was terminated;
d) imposed a designated system of quality control.
Decree 746, supra note 159, at 272-73.
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documents16 and information,"" defined a "technological contri-
bution," 165 allowed SIEX to monitor execution of all registered
contracts,166 and excluded additional restrictive clauses.
16 7
C. Liberalization: Decrees 1200 and 727
In July 1986, Venezuela began to liberalize its technology
transfer and foreign investment regime by issuing Decree
120016 -the most thorough repudiation of Decision 24 by any
ANCOM member.16 9 Decree 1200 loosened regulations on technol-
ogy transfer, contemporaneously adopted tax and foreign exchange




Decree 727171 completed Venezuela's reversal of its previous
restrictive technology transfer and foreign investment policies."
Its passage was due to Decision 220 and the new economic liber-
alism of Venezuelan President Perez, who realized that Venezuela,
to develop more rapidly, required substantial foreign investment
and technology.
173
Decree 727's central objective was to assure foreign investors
and technology suppliers of greatly reduced governmental re-
straints. Chapter XII, on the importation of technology and patent
and trademark exploitation began: "All contracts . . . for the im-
portation of technology and on the use and exploitation of patents
and trademarks, regardless of the nature thereof, are hereby au-
thorized."'' 74 The Decree reduced technology licensing restrictions
and eliminated governmental discretion involving contractual
163. Decree 2442, supra note 160, art. 64.
164. Id. art. 65.
165. Id. art. 68.
166. Id. art. 70.
167. Id. art. 73.
168. Decree 1200, July 16, 1986, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA., No. 3,881, Aug. 29, 1986,
translated in 26 I.L.M. 763 (1987).
169. Pate, supra note 141, at 761.
170. Id. at 762; see also Claudio Costa, La Disciplina dei Contratti di Trasferimento di
Tecnologia in Venezuela dopo l'Emanzione del Decreto N. 1200 del 16 Luglio 1986, 28
DiRETTo COMUNITARIO E DEGLI SCAMBI INTERNAZIONALI 470, 486 (1989).
171. Decree 727, Jan. 18, 1990, GACETA OFICIAL, No. 34,397, Jan. 26, 1990 (Venez.),
translated in 29 I.L.M. 278 (1990).
172. John R. Pate, Decree No. 727 on Foreign Investment, Technology Licensing and
Foreign Credit Regulations, 29 I.L.M. 273, 273 (1990).
173. Id. at 275.
174. Decree 727, supra note 171, art. 62.
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agreements. Decision 727 simplified the law by stating that the
only banned restrictive clauses in technology transfer contracts
were (i) those contemplated in Decision 220 or other national laws
and (ii) those determined by the President.
1 75
D. Venezuela and ANCOM Decision 313
There is considerable doubt over whether Decision 313 is yet
law in Venezuela. 176 Until Decision 313 is formally adopted, the
earlier 1955 Industrial Property Law remains in force."" The Ven-
ezuelan College of Patent and Trademark Agents (COVAPI) main-
tains that Decision 313 took effect in Venezuela on February 14,
1992, the date it was signed.178 In June 1992, the Venezuelan Reg-
istrar of Patents and Trademarks claimed that "Decision 313 is in
effect, but we are not applying it.'
' 79
The Venezuelan Gaceta Oficial published Decision 313 on Au-
gust 5, 1992.180 In October 1992, the Venezuelan Industrial Prop-
erty Registrar and Attorney General claimed that Decision 313 be-
came effective in Venezuela upon publication.' 8 ' A treatise lists
Decision 313 as current Venezuelan Law. 182 Yet, lawyers conduct
litigation using the 1955 law.183
On November 17, 1992, La Cdmara de Laboratorios Venezola-
nos (LAVES), a trade group for Venezuelan pharmaceutical inter-
ests, brought suit, challenging the adoption of Decision 313.184 The
Venezuelan Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction, under its power
175. Id. art. 67.
176. See Sweeney, supra note 17, at 22; see also Thomas L. Hughes, Industrial Prop-
erty Law Modified, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1992, at 41.
177. John Wade, Venezuela: New Law Tackles IP Pirates, Bus. LATIN AM., Aug. 24,
1992, at 285, 290-91.
178. See Brown, supra note 65, at 33.
179. Richard N. Brown, Venezuela's New Trademark Law: Decision 313 of the Andean
Pact, TRADEMARK WORLD, June 1992, at 23.
180. Decision 313, Common Regime of Industrial Property, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No.
4,451, Aug. 5, 1992 (Venez.).
181. See Hughes, supra note 176, at 41.
182. See TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, at V-7 (Nancy H. Morowitz ed., 4th
ed. 1993).
183. For instance, litigation in the HOLA case, supra text accompanying notes 2-17, is
based on the 1955 Law of Industrial Property.
184. Brief of LAVES to the Venezuelan Supreme Court requesting the nullification of
the Executive act of publication of Decision 313 [hereinafter LAVES Brief) (on file with the
Inter-American Law Review).
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to nullify unconstitutional executive acts.18 5
LAVES challenged the adoption of Decision 313 on the
grounds that the Decision (i) violated specific articles of the Vene-
zuelan Constitution and (ii) disregarded Venezuelan reservations
to ANCOM supranationality1 e6
LAVES based its constitutional attack on the right to prop-
erty,187 the right to intellectual property,88 and separation of pow-
ers. '9 It claimed adoption would violate procedures for reforming
existing laws, 90 contending that Decision 313's grant of patents to
pharmaceuticals on the WHO list constituted an unconstitutional
modification. 9'
The suit also charged that Decision 313's adoption violated
Venezuela's entrance to ANCOM 192 and approval of the creation of
the ANCOM Court of Justice.9 3 This charge was rooted in the
treaty creating the ANCOM Court of Justice. 94 That treaty stated
that decisions of the ANCOM Commission were effective when
published in the ANCOM Gaceta Oficial, unless the decision pro-
vided for a later date. 9 ' Venezuela made reservations to these
powers, upon joining ANCOM, by declaring "the decisions of the
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement that modify Venezuelan
law, or within the competency of the Legislature, must be ap-
proved by a law of the Congress."'' 9 Venezuela used that same lan-
guage when it approved the ANCOM Court of Justice. 97 The Ven-
185. CONST. VENEZ. art. 215.
186. LAVES Brief, supra note 184, at 2.
187. CONST. VENEZ. art. 99.
188. Id. art. 100.
189. Implicated in the suit are CONST. VENEZ. art. 118 (each governmental branch has
its separate function with all cooperating to reach state goals), art. 119 (usurped power is
ineffectual and null), and art. 138 (legislative power is carried out by Congress). LAVES
Brief, supra note 184, at 22.
190. CONST. VENEZ. art. 177.
191. LAVES Brief, supra note 184, at 24.
192. Law Approving the Cartagena Agreement, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA., No. 1,620, Nov.
1, 1973 (Venez.).
193. Law Approving the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agree-
ment, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA., No. 3,216, July 7, 1983 (Venez.).
194. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, translated in 18
I.L.M. 1203 (1979).
195. Id. art. 3; see also Pate, supra note 69, at 975.
196. Law Approving the Cartagena Agreement, supra note 192, art. 1 (author's transla-
tion). In Spanish: "las decisiones de la Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena que modifiquen
la legislaci6n venezolana, a sean materia de la competencia del Poder Legislativo, re-
quieren la aprobaci6n mediante Ley, del Congreso de la Republica."
197. Law Approving the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agree-
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ezuelan Supreme Court upheld those reservations'
constitutionality in 1990.198
Until Venezuela resolves Decision 313's applicability, it will
continue to maintain an inadequate system of intellectual property
protection. Venezuela's ambivalence has already hurt its reputa-
tion in the international business community. 9 9 Venezuela can
only anticipate further deterioration of its reputation until a more
definite position on Decision 313 is secured.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
VENEZUELA
Enforcement is an integral component of intellectual property
regimes,10° and enforcement of existing Venezuelan intellectual
property law is ineffectual.2 0' Of fifty thousand patents registered
during a period of thirty-nine years, Venezuela has enforced only
three.20 2 The HOLA scandal dramatically illustrates this absence of
legal protection for trademarks.
Venezuela does not lack legal provisions to protect intellectual
property rights. The Venezuelan Constitution creates a right to
protection for patents, copyrights, and trademarks.2 0 3 In theory,
this right combined with remedies in the Civil Code relating to un-
just enrichment204 could create an action for unfair competition.
2 0
5
An injunction is theoretically possible under the Civil Procedure
Code.206 Venezuelan penal law provides for prison terms of one
month to a year for intellectual property violations.207 In addition,
the 1955 Industrial Property Law provides a similar prison term
for trademark or patent infringement. 08
ment, supra note 193, art. 2.
198. Judgment of July 10, 1990 (Jost Guillermo Andueza), Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Naci6n, - Fallos - (Venez.) (on file with the University of Miami Inter-American
Law Review).
199. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 14.
200. See Franklin Hoet Linares and Alain Coriat, Efectividad de los Derechos de
Propriedad Intelectual en Venezuela, in DERECHO DE LA PROPRIEDAD INDUSTRIAL 277 (1989).
201. See Carlos E. Acedo Sucre, Algunos Aspectos de la Propiedad Intelectual en Ven-
ezuela, 43 REV. FAC. DERECHO 13, 15 (1991) (Venez.).
202. Brown, supra note 20, at 355.
203. CONST. VENEZ. art. 100.
204. C6D. Civ. arts. 1184, 1185 (Venez.).
205. Hoet Linares & Coriat, supra note 200, at 282.
206. Id.
207. C6D. PEN. arts. 338-40 (Venez.).
208. 1955 Industrial Property Law, supra note 14, arts. 98-100.
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The level of intellectual property protection a plaintiff receives
depends on whether the action is brought in a civil, criminal, or
administrative tribunal. 0 9 Criminal litigation is slow and ineffec-
tive.210 In addition, the movant in a criminal suit may encounter a
countersuit for damages.2 1
Civil procedures may not comport with United States concepts
of fairness.212 A report on foreign intellectual property protection
compiled by the United States Trade Commission 21 cited Vene-
zuela for inadequate criminal penalties, inadequate civil remedies,
lack of seizure and impoundment remedies, lack of compulsory
process and/or discovery, and inadequate training and resources
for enforcement.214
The Venezuelan Constitution provides private enterprise a
wide range of rights.215 The absence of legal protection for trade-
marks lies not in the absence of constitutional protection and rem-
edies, but in the fact that they are under-enforced.1 ' Rather than
regulating justice, constitutions in Venezuela have been political
expedients.21 7 Due to socio-political forces, the phrase, "la Consti-
tuci6n sirve para todo,"21 describes Venezuelan constitutional law.
While having tremendous potential, the Venezuelan Constitu-
tion may inhibit, rather than aid, the process of heightened intel-
lectual property protection. Corporations receive constitutional
protection only if they conform to national goals.219 Until intellec-
tual property protection is a national objective, the Constitution
will serve the agenda of groups such as LAVES, rather than those
lobbying for enhanced intellectual property rights.
209. Hoet Linares & Coriat, supra note 200, at 278.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 283.
212. See Richard N. Brown, Nonuse Cancellation of Used Trademarks in Venezuela,
17 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J. 349 (1987).
213. FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S.
INDUSTRY AND TRADE, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, INVESTIGATION
No. 332-245, UNDER SECTION 332(g) OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930, USITC Pub. 2065, (1988).
214. Id. at 3-10.
215. See, e.g., CONST. VENEZ. art. 68 (right to use organs of administrative justice to
defend private rights), art. 96 (freedom of entrepreneurial activity), art. 98 (private enter-
prise is protected by the State), and art. 99 (right to own private property).
216. See Richard V. Campagna, Constitutional and Administrative Rights of Private
Enterprise in Venezuela and Their Protection, 16 INT'L LAW. 541, 542 (1982).
217. See Miriam Kornblith, The Politics of Constitution-Making: Constitutions and
Democracy in Venezuela, 23 J. LATIN AM. STUDIES 61, 62 (1991).
218. Id. In English, the phrase is: "The Constitution serves any purpose." Id. at 62 n.5.
219. CONST. VENEZ. art. 72.
[Vol. 25:1
1993] VENEZUELAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 155
As for civil and criminal penalties, the outlook is bleak. Per-
haps the greatest barrier to effective intellectual property rights
enforcement is the failure of the Venezuelan judiciary to acknowl-
edge that there is a problem.220 This lack of consciousness is exac-
erbated by a shortage of intellectual property lawyers, a situation
common to Latin America.2 ' In addition, budgetary constraints
create problems ranging from poorly staffed registries and inade-
quate translations,222 to a lack of access to courts.2 23
VI. ANALYSIS
Decision 313 provides a foundation for improved intellectual
property protection in Venezuela. While not granting the degree of
protection desired by some interests, particularly foreign pharma-
ceutical manufacturers, it does allow for a level of intellectual
property protection sufficient to satisfy the quid pro quo to partici-
pate in liberalized trading regimes and bilateral trade agreements.
Will Venezuela utilize Decision 313 to transform its reputation
as a "free-rider" into one of international cooperation? To do that,
Venezuelan policymakers must balance the interests of short-term
profit maximization afforded by weak national intellectual prop-
erty laws against the more nebulous, less quantifiable long-term
benefits of a more rigorous intellectual property regime. This sec-
tion uses the metaphor of a bazaar to illustrate the decision-mak-
ing process, and looks at the sectors of Venezuelan politics most
able to bring about enforcement of Decision 313.
A. Intellectual Property Decision-Making in Venezuela: A
"Bazaar" Situation
Opportunity for increased trade is the most attractive feature
of stronger intellectual property rights in Venezuela. Just as these
perceived opportunities were an integral component of North-
South relations during the commodity-power era of the 1970s, the
perceived benefits of free trade might equally induce increased in-
tellectual property protection.
220. Hoet Linares & Coriat, supra note 200, at 278.
221. See Brown, supra note 20, at 350 (stating there are no more than fifty full-time
intellectual property lawyers in any Latin American country).
222. Sucre, supra note 201, at 17.
223. See MARIOLGA QUINTERO TIRADO, JUSTICIA Y REALIDAD: UN ENFOQUE ANALITICO DE
LA ADMINISTRACI6N DE JUSTICIA EN LA VENEZUELA CONTEMPORANEA 173 (1988).
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While once seen as separate domains, international trade and
intellectual property are now perceived as interrelated.2" When
ANCOM enacted Decision 311, for example, it also passed more
trade liberalization reforms in two days than it had in the previous
twenty-two years.226 Venezuela's approach to Decision 313 reflects
not merely a selection of national intellectual property laws, but
also an aspect of international economic policy. Venezuelan policy
toward Decision 313 must weigh the benefits of free trade and
technology transfer against the short-term benefits of lax intellec-
tual property protection.
Technology transfer negotiations between Latin America, de-
veloped countries, and multinational corporations (MNCs) are
analogous to "bazaar" behavior. 2 e Technology is one of those rare
products with a marginal cost of zero; once created, no further
costs of production are incurred. 227 This affords tremendous lati-
tude in bargaining because of the difference between the high cost
of development of technology and the low marginal cost of its
sale.228
MNCs are interested in profit-maximization, 29 and base their
transfer of technology decisions on financial and investment crite-
ria.230 Latin American countries, suffering a perceived inferiority of
bargaining position in technology transfer negotiations, 21 have at-
tempted to increase their bargaining power in technology transfer
224. See Gadbaw, supra note 57, at 226-29.
225. Laurie MacNamara, Andean Region Makes Integration Effort, Bus. AM., Mar. 23,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSAMR File.
226. See Brian G. Brunsvold, Negotiation Techniques for Warranty and Enforcement
Clauses in International Licensing Agreements, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 285 (1981)
(describing licensing agreement negotiations as "Indian blanket technique," whereby the
licensor's request for payment is much higher than the amount it will accept); see also Jova,
supra note 27, at 455 (describing Latin American transfer of technology negotiations as a
bargain/compact).
227. Lawrence F. Ebb, Transfers of Foreign Technology in Latin America: The Birth
of Antitrust Law?, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 728 (1975).
228. Id.
229. See Homer 0. Blair, Technology Transfer as an Issue in North/South Negotia-
tions, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 306-07 (1981).
230. See R. Seymour, Patents and the Transfer of Technology, in TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FIRMs 36 (Frank R. Bradbury ed., 1978) (suggesting that
MNCs' technology transfer decisions are not a "capitalist-contrived plot suggested by some
Third World nations," but the necessary result of pressures that shareholders seeking profit
maximization place on corporate managers).
231. William S. Barnes, Technology Rules in Latin America: A Study in Comparative
Law, 3 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
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negotiations with MNCs by using state intervention.2 32
The rhetoric surrounding North-South relations in the area of
technology transfer is comparable to the colorful language of a ba-
zaar. Technology transfer is labeled "the most critical instru-
ment" 233 for socioeconomic development, possessing a "fundamen-
tally unique character,"'234 equivalent to "the genetic code ... of all
mankind."2 5 Meanwhile, trade groups in developed countries de-
scribe Latin American intellectual property regimes as "semi-
nationalization.
236
The bazaar metaphor illuminates present-day Venezuelan
technology transfer negotiations and intellectual property policy
formation. The metaphor may be applied both to rule promulga-
tion and ineffective enforcement of intellectual property rights. If
and when Venezuelan policymakers believe they will gain from the
"bargain" of free trade and bilateral agreements, they will supply
the effective intellectual property protection which licensors desire.
Similarly, if licensors decide that the cost of continued ineffective
intellectual property law, with no end in sight, cancels any profits
gained from access to Latin America, 37 they will forego technology
transfer agreements altogether. Formal adoption of Decision 313
would enhance the goal of free trade built on bilateral cooperative
agreements.
B. Policy-Making in Venezuela: Venezuelan Elites
Access to government power is the cornerstone of Venezuelan
politics.238 Beginning in the Betancourt administration of the late
1950s, the Venezuelan government began to deliberately forge
channels of communication with interest groups.2 3 This alliance
between government and the private sector became institutional-
ized under the label of concertaci6n.2 0
232. Correa, supra note 22, at 391.
233. Barnes, supra note 231, at 10.
234. Surenda J. Patel, The Technological Transformation of the Third World: Main
Issues for Action, in UNCTAD AND THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE, THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS
124, 125 (Michael Zammit Cutajar ed., 1985).
235. Id.
236. Ebb, supra note 227, at 720.
237. Latin American countries' bargaining power lies in access to markets, cheap labor,
and raw materials. See Ebb, supra note 227, at 728.
238. Jost ANTONIO GIL YEPES, THE CHALLENGE OF VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY 147 (1981).
239. Id. at 184.
240. TALAVERA, supra note 133, at 278.
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The government created quasi-governmental policy-making
groups known as "plural bodies"2" 1 and filled them primarily with




This absence of legal perspectives in major policy-making groups
may present a barrier to change in Venezuela's intellectual prop-
erty climate because Latin American businessmen currently give
little regard to trademark and patent systems.24
The incestuous relationship between the Venezuelan govern-
ment and those Venezuelan elites capable of capital formation rep-
resents another barrier to intellectual property changes. The ma-
jority of capital in Venezuela is concentrated in a few powerful
families.4 5 Members of these families have held important roles in
government, including the Ministries of Finance and Develop-
ment.240 The HOLA case illustrates the power of such positions
and their importance to intellectual property issues. The Minister
of Development has played such a key role in the scandal that he
is now known throughout the world as "the HOLA minister.
'24 7
If it were true that the Venezuelan techno-bureaucracy looks
to maintain the status quo, 48 then the prospects for increased in-
tellectual property protection in Venezuela would be slim. While
one commentator suggests that Venezuelan policymakers have sup-
planted grand schemes of development in favor of pragmatic solu-
tions,249 this can cut two ways. Is it more pragmatic to strive for
enhanced intellectual property protection or to maintain the status
of an intellectual property "free-rider"?
VII. CONCLUSION
Decision 313 offers the possibility of improved intellectual
property protection-an essential component of participation in
free trade agreements between developed countries and Latin
America. It also provides Venezuela with the chance to affirma-
241. Id. at 319.
242. Id. at 306-18.
243. Id.
244. See Brown, supra note 20, at 350.
245. See TALAVERA, supra note 133, at 322-24.
246. Id. at 324-25.
247. Sweeney, supra note 17, at 22.
248. See ISABEL LICHA, TECNO-BUROCRACIA Y DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA 1936-1984, at
77 (1990).
249. YEPES, supra note 238, at 148.
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tively express to the international community its commitment to
increased intellectual property protection.
Commentators and some lawyers in Venezuela recognize the
connection between the opportunity for free trade and intellectual
property protection.2 5 Venezuelan reaction to Decision 313 has
been ambivalent, however, and a stable intellectual property re-
gime remains a chimera. The HOLA scandal illustrates this insta-
bility. Venezuela must decide. It can either provide stable intellec-
tual property protection or become a pariah excluded from
international free trade.
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